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Following the demise of the polygraph, supporters of assisted scientific lie detection
tools have enthusiastically appropriated neuroimaging technologies “as the savior of
scientifically verifiable lie detection in the courtroom” (Gerard, 2008: 5). These proponents
believe the future impact of neuroscience “will be inevitable, dramatic, and will
fundamentally alter the way the law does business” (Erickson, 2010: 29); however, such
enthusiasm may prove premature. For in nearly every article published by independent
researchers in peer reviewed journals, the respective authors acknowledge that fMRI
research, processes, and technology are insufficiently developed and understood for
gatekeepers to even consider introducing these neuroimaging measures into criminal
courts as they stand today for the purpose of determining the veracity of statements
made. Regardless of how favorable their analyses of fMRI or its future potential, they all
acknowledge the presence of issues yet to be resolved. Even assuming a future where
these issues are resolved and an appropriate fMRI lie-detection process is developed,
its integration into criminal trials is not assured for the very success of such a future
system may necessitate its exclusion from courtrooms on the basis of existing legal and
ethical prohibitions. In this piece, aimed for a multidisciplinary readership, we seek to
highlight and bring together the multitude of hurdles which would need to be successfully
overcome before fMRI can (if ever) be a viable applied lie detection system. We argue
that the current status of fMRI studies on lie detection meets neither basic legal nor
scientific standards. We identify four general classes of hurdles (scientific, legal and
ethical, operational, and social) and provide an overview on the stages and operations
involved in fMRI studies, as well as the difficulties of translating these laboratory protocols
into a practical criminal justice environment. It is our overall conclusion that fMRI is unlikely
to constitute a viable lie detector for criminal courts.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years researchers in cognitive neuroscience have started
to investigate the neural basis of complexmental processes includ-
ing moral beliefs, intentions, preferences, self-knowledge, social
interactions, and consciousness. Influential neuroscientists are
introducing the idea that our traditional notions of crime and
punishment (and the laws built upon them) should be challenged,
and if necessary modified, to make them more human-friendly.
Recent empirical findings with neuroimaging techniques chal-
lenge the central idea of free will around which much of the crim-
inal law has been shaped (see e.g., Gazzaniga, 2008). Additionally,
structural MRI evidence is making inroads in courts around the
World [see e.g., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Pirela, 2007;
Caso Bayout—Corte d’Assise d’Appello di Trieste (n.5/2009) del
18 settembre 2009; Tribunale di Como (n.536/2011) del 20 mag-
gio 2011] and it seems that not before long functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) scans will be routinely requested by
the defense when searching for either mitigating factors, such
as anatomo-functional abnormalities, and/or the presence of any
crucial memories when self-reports can be doubted (e.g., Abbott,
2001, 2007; Hughes, 2010). On similar grounds, and concomi-
tant with attempts to promote fMRI as a mind-reading tool
(see Logothetis, 2008, for a specialist overview), fMRI has been
proposed as a possible state-of-the-art tool for detecting both
malignancy and deception in criminal courts even though it has
not yet been considered admissible evidence (e.g., US v. Semrau,
2010; http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/2010/06/
01/fmri-lie-detection-fails-its-first-hearing-on-reliability/, also
see Sip et al., 2007, 2008 and Haynes, 2008, for contrasting spe-
cialist views on applications in lie detection). In addition to
raising questions regarding fMRI’s reliability as a lie detecting
tool according to scientific standards, such advocacy raises ethi-
cal and legal issues that are common to any putative lie detection
technology thus engaging the attention of lawyers, ethicists, and
philosophers.
Despite all these concerns fMRI is already being advertised as
a scientifically proven lie detector by private companies having
strong links with academia (see No Lie MRI—http://noliemri.
com/ and CEPHOS—http://www.cephoscorp.com/), one that
has not (yet) been subjected to the same regulation as the
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polygraph and thus is not considered an illegal means of assess-
ment in pre-employment settings. As “trust” is increasingly pri-
oritized in certain business sectors, top-tier corporations may be
tempted to assess the trustworthiness of their key current and
future employees by requesting they undergo a lie detection test
via fMRI. However, in the more conservative criminal justice
sector, several hurdles confront any use of fMRI as a viable lie
detector. We will attempt herein to provide a realistic and accessi-
ble evaluation of such hurdles by discussing those questions raised
by fMRI use for lie-detection purposes in criminal courts.
But firstly in the following two sections we take a brief look
at the basics of this technique in order to gauge an impression of
what types of evidence fMRI currently may and may not be able
to provide. For although most neuroscientists would agree that
fMRI should not be used as a lie detector, especially within its
current form (e.g., Grafton et al., 2006; Tovino, 2007), the debate
has recently seen the identification of a possible route toward the
use of fMRI for lie detection by separating scientific from legal
standards (Schauer, 2010) or basic from translational research
(Langleben and Moriarty, 2013).
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING: BASICS
fMRI is one of the most popular measurement techniques in
cognitive neuroscience. It has been in use for about 20 years
and is qualified as correlational because it records brain states in
parallel with ongoing mental activity and/or behavior, thus per-
mitting the establishment of correlational links between them.
However, it does not allow researchers to establish a causal
connection between brain states and behaviors or supposed
mental processes. In most fMRI studies, brain states are the
dependent variable measured during manipulation of the stim-
ulus/task condition. Whether any specific local or systemic pat-
tern of brain states is a necessary determinant of its associated
behavior it cannot be determined with fMRI only. For this
reason, fMRI is routinely used in basic research as a main-
stay method to measure brain function and its data are often
triangulated with data from complementary techniques (e.g.,
event-related potentials, transcranial magnetic stimulation), in a
quest for converging evidence about mental processes and brain
substrates.
As implied by its name, fMRI makes use of strong mag-
netic fields to create images of biological tissue. Depending on
the pulse sequence 1 of the electromagnetic fields it generates, an
MRI scanner can detect different tissue properties and distinguish
between tissue types. Scanners are used to acquire both brain
structural information (e.g., allowing a fine distinction between
white and gray matter, producing images of the static anatomy of
the brain), and functional2 information such as measurements of
local changes in blood oxygenation within the brain over time;
1A pulse sequence is the series of changing magnetic field gradients and oscil-
lating electromagnetic fields defined by the user that allows the MRI scanner
to tune on and create images sensitive to a target physical property. Different
pulse sequences, for example, are used when collecting structural data and
functional brain activations.
2The term “functional” refers to changes in brain function and regional levels
of activation over time.
the most common form of fMRI study. Because blood oxygena-
tion levels change rapidly (i.e., after 1–2 s) following the activity
of neurons in a brain region, fMRI allows researchers to localize
brain activity on a second-by-second basis and within millime-
ters of its origin (Logothetis and Pfeuffer, 2004). These changes
in blood oxygenation occur naturally and internally as part of
normal brain physiology and, because the pulse sequence does
not alter neuronal firing or blood flow, fMRI is considered a
non-invasive technique (Huettel et al., 2009).
Central to cognitive fMRI studies are the concepts of differ-
ences and similarities between maps of blood oxygenation level-
dependent (BOLD) signal3 that are recorded in concomitance with
different experimental conditions. In classical fMRI designs and
in most of the available lie detection studies BOLD responses are
evaluated in relative terms as the result of a contrast between two
or more conditions. For example, maps of the BOLD signal that
are recorded while a participant is lying can be contrasted with
either maps recorded when the participant is at rest or when is
telling the truth. Inferences about the neural correlates of lying
are typically drawn from an analysis of the pattern of differences
and/or similarities between BOLD signal maps across lying and
not-lying conditions 4. In principle, any design difference (e.g.,
the use of a different stimulus or the requirement of additional
mental operations given the same stimulus) between the lying
condition and any other condition with which it is compared
might lead to the recruitment of different brain regions to per-
form the task. Therefore, the more accurately the not-lying and
lying conditions are matched, the more precise the conclusions
that can be drawn about the neural correlates uniquely associ-
ated with lying. While this type of analysis is not the only possible
or optimal way to draw informative inferences from fMRI data
(e.g., Sartori and Umiltà, 2002) such contrast between condi-
tions is a basic standard in fMRI research. We would like to draw
the attention here on the fact that the possibility to interpret
as specific correlates of lying any findings ultimately resides in
the original choice and design of experimental and control con-
ditions. More recent approaches to the discrimination between
lying vs. not-lying correlates include data-driven pattern classifi-
cation algorithms (e.g., Davatzikos et al., 2005; Kozel et al., 2005),
3fMRI is based on the difference in magnetic resonance signals from oxy-
hemoglobin and deoxyhemoglobin and builds on the fact that active brain
regions tend to use more oxygen than relatively inactive regions. Soon after a
brain region has been activated by a cognitive event or task, the local microvas-
culature responds to increased oxygen consumption by increasing the flow
of new arterial blood (i.e., blood rich in oxyhemoglobin) to the region. As a
consequence, the relative concentration of deoxyhemoglobin decreases, thus
causing localized changes in the magnetic resonance signal. These changes are
known as blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signal (Purves et al.,
2013).
4For a broad overview on other relevant testing paradigms—that can also be
used in fMRI studies—we direct the reader toward Gamer (2011). For an
insightful discussion on the complexity of deception and the unlikelihood
of encompassing it by using simple tasks that require participants to lie in
response to certain stimuli and tell the truth in response to others, we direct
the reader toward Sip et al. (2007). Our discussion will provide prototypical
examples in order to highlight general principles; it is by no means aimed to
provide a comprehensive and systematic description of the vast literature on
the topic.
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which are bound to the possibility of an independent and objec-
tive classification of lie vs. truth (Sip et al., 2008). Common to
all approaches within brain data analyses however is that that
which is identified as the “correlates of lying” even at the indi-
vidual level would be expected to emerge across several lying trials
thereby capturing similarities across different instances of “lying,”
rather than simply representing singularities associated with an
individual instance of lying.
When evaluating fMRI evidence, with an eye on applying it
to a real-world problem, it is important not only to be aware
of basic experimental design principles but also of the pecu-
liar requirements of the technique and its limitations (Spence,
2008). In this regard both scanner reliability and staff technical
skills are fundamental to the internal validity 5 of fMRI-testing
protocols. This is often an issue since control conditions need
to be carefully matched to experimental conditions in order to
unequivocally isolate the construct of interest 6. However, even
with an elegant design the reliability and localization of BOLD
signals depends on the extent to which participants perform
their tasks accurately, consistently, and in compliance with all
instructions (for example, not moving their head as movement
will degrade the image). To double-check participant’s compli-
ance, behavior should be monitored and recorded during the
scanning session whenever possible (e.g., by recording reaction
times and accuracy in a task), and in experiments involving
arousal or emotional stimuli, skin conductance, heart-rate or sali-
vary hormones could be also monitored to provide converging
information.
The outcome of data analysis is a function of a series of
consensus-based decisions, including options and parameters
chosen for realignment, normalization, and smoothing, statis-
tical models for analyses, and the associated correction criteria
that can be more or less conservative. Finally, strategic decisions
may guide choice of the evidence that will find its way in the
final report on a peer-reviewed journal. Although raw data may
be requested by anyone for further analyses, most readers will
exclusively rely on the information provided in a polished report.
Furthermore, in very competitive scientific environments there
is no incentive for investigators to try and replicate their own
findings as journals typically promote the publication of novel
designs rather than replications (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, 2012), and
in real practice it is very unusual to see a brain imaging exper-
iment precisely repeated within and between laboratories. This
may prove especially problematic when trying to identify a well-
known and reliable protocol for potential applications in the real
world. Finally, numerous safety exclusion criteria apply which
limits the generalizability of fMRI results and prevents its uni-
versal use (see a typical participant screening checklist at http://
airto.hosted.ats.ucla.edu/BMCweb/Consent/SafetyScreen.html).
5Internal Validity refers to the appropriateness of construct operationaliza-
tion and of experimental design in order to test the hypothesis of interest.
It guarantees that any obtained effects may be univocally attributed to the
experimental manipulation. Clearly, the use of expensive and fancy techniques
does not guarantee by itself that experimental results are meaningful and
interpretable.
6In this context, the “construct of interest” is the brain fingerprint of lying.
In summary, protocol design determines how fMRI evidence
can be interpreted, full compliance is required from participants,
and the final evidence reflects choices, assumptions and data
transformations based on current scientific standards and con-
sensus criteria but also on publication strategies. Finally, not
everybody can undergo fMRI. So the question remains, can its
potential contributions as a lie detector outweigh its intrinsic
limitations?
THE LYING BRAIN
Many people believe they are very good at detecting deceit and
that certain signs give away when somebody is lying: liars would
talk too much and tell stories far more elaborate and detailed
than required by the context; they would never gaze interlocu-
tors straight in the eyes or would stare at them too intensely;
or they would cross their arms or their legs; or a combina-
tion of behaviors (e.g., Houston et al., 2012). Yet studies show
that the vast majority of onlookers correctly distinguish truth
from lies when told by a stranger only about 54% of the time
(i.e., they are only slightly better than chance). Notably, this
same level of (in)accuracy holds true even for professional cat-
egories such as lawyers, policemen, magistrates, and psychiatrists
(Bond and DePaulo, 2006).
Conversely, the ability to lie develops spontaneously (it is typ-
ically absent in children with neuro-developmental impairments,
like autism). Lying is fundamental to healthy behavior, as shown
by the disastrous social interactions of patients with orbito-
frontal lesions. Indeed some of these patients become notoriously
tactless—which in a final analysis can be achieved by always being
completely frank and honest. The literature on orbito-frontal
patients suggests in turn that the ability to lie depends on the
integrity of localized neural circuits (e.g., Damasio, 1994).
Recent attempts have been made with fMRI to specify the neu-
ral correlates of lying or deception (see Christ et al., 2009; Abe,
2011 and Gamer, 2011 for recent overviews and meta-analyses;
see Sip et al., 2007 for a discussion on deception and lying from
a cognitive neuroscience perspective). In one of the typical exper-
iments, researchers ask participants to answer truthfully to some
questions/stimuli and lie in response to others. The BOLD con-
trast7 between the two conditions (i.e., the pattern of BOLD
signals detected when the participant is lying minus the pattern
of BOLD signals detected when the participant is being truth-
ful; also indicated in the specialist literature as Lie > Truth)
is expected to enable the identification of brain regions whose
activation is significantly correlated with lying. Accordingly, sev-
eral studies identified a network of parieto-frontal8 areas that are
significantly more engaged when the individual is lying. As the
opposite contrast (i.e., Truth > Lie) does not usually detect any
regions that are significantly more engaged, most neuroscien-
tists infer that lying requires extra-effort compared to responding
truthfully. Such extra-effort is possibly aimed at inhibiting the
7The difference in signal on fMRI images from different experimental condi-
tions as a function of the amount of deoxygenated hemoglobin.
8The term “parieto-frontal” areas denotes brain regions in the parietal and
frontal lobes. The parietal lobe is located on the posterior and dorsal surfaces
of the cerebrum. The frontal lobe is the most anterior lobe of the cerebrum.
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truth and/or producing an alternative response that sounds real-
istic enough. In studies employing ecologically plausible stimuli,
activation of regions in the limbic system (a deep brain structure
traditionally associated with emotional responses) has also been
associated with lying (e.g., Hakun et al., 2009). Note however that
this does not imply in any mechanistic way that a person is lying
when the same region of the limbic system or network of pari-
etofrontal areas activates during a task (e.g., Poldrack, 2006, 2010;
see also following Scientific Hurdles section, point 1). Finally, a
great part of research on the neural correlates of deception has
been focused on group-level results (i.e., results that are obtained
by averaging data from several participants), whereas any real-
world application would require a differential approach (i.e., it
should provide evidence that is informative and predictive at the
individual level).
Within a basic cognitive neuroscience perspective, fMRI
research on deception can indeed aspire to provide correla-
tion maps that possibly reflect the difference between deceitful
and truthful responses. In order to obtain knowledge about
the anatomo-functional substrates that are causally related to
lying, and disambiguate potentially spurious activations, evidence
would need to be collected with complementary techniques (e.g.,
with neurological lesion or non-invasive brain stimulation stud-
ies). fMRI is thus useful inasmuch as it hands over to techniques
with complementary inferential power a map for (1) identify-
ing cortical networks that play a necessary role in deception, and
(2) testing their role by directly manipulating an individual’s abil-
ity to deceive. This information could then feed back into fMRI
maps and enable the identification of the most relevant correlates
of lying for applicative purposes. The ability to establish causal
links between brain substrates and behavior resides in the fact that
the functionality of the brain tissue underlying stimulators can be
temporarily modulated (e.g., see ; Nitsche et al., 2008; Sandrini
et al., 2011). For example, by modulating the activity of frontal
lobe areas with non-invasive brain stimulation, Priori et al. (2008)
were able to interfere with intentional deception by slowing down
the production of untruthful responses (see also Mameli et al.,
2010). Karim et al. (2010) could enhance the ability to lie by
modulating activity in a contiguous part of the frontal lobe, the
anterior prefrontal cortex. It thus seems possible to manipulate
efficiency in lie production by targeting specific brain regions (see
Luber et al., 2009, for a discussion of related ethical implications),
although careful task analysis, replication and clarification of the
underlying mechanisms of action of non-invasive brain stimula-
tion techniques need to be carried out before endorsing any mass
applications. This should suggest how in basic neuroscience (1)
fMRI can contribute to our models of the brain substrates of
lying, however for completeness its evidence is best integrated
with evidence from complementary techniques, (2) fMRI evi-
dence alone does not provide compelling evidence as to whether
certain neural substrates are strictly necessary to the process of
lying. Other techniques may help restrict the focus to a subset of
potential substrates.
As a final point it is worth remembering that in basic research
a participant’s compliance with instructions is almost taken for
granted as there is no rational reason why a participant might
benefit from not following them. Quite the opposite situation
may arise in a criminal forensic setting however, whereby it is not
difficult to imagine that either intentional (e.g., adopting coun-
termeasures) or non-intentional (e.g., due to alterations in one’s
emotional state) factors may lead to inconclusive results. In this
respect, a recent study by Ganis et al. (2011) has eloquently shown
how easy it is to “fool” an fMRI test for participants who have
been trained in the use of task-tailored countermeasures.
fMRI AS LIE DETECTOR IN CRIMINAL COURTS
THE SCIENTIFIC HURDLES
Legal systems are not new to influences from the cognitive neu-
rosciences. For example, admissible MRI evidence showing the
absence of frontal lobe maturation in the brains of teenagers con-
tributed to the elimination of the death penalty for minors in
some US states (frontal lobes are causally implicated in decision-
making and the control of impulsive reactions; e.g., Damasio,
1994; Coricelli and Rusconi, 2011). Additionally structural brain
scans are widely admissible at sentencing and are now almost
invariably present in capital cases. However, when it comes to lie
detection not all procedures have proven acceptable with poly-
graphs failing to attain general admissibility in criminal courts9
with the exception of New Mexico.
Despite this final fact, in 2006 two private bodies No Lie
MRI and Cephos Corporation were launched with the goal of
bringing fMRI lie detection to the public for use in legal proceed-
ings, employment screening, and national security investigations.
Detection accuracy was claimed to be as high as 90% (compared
to a purported 70% for polygraphs). Attempts are being made
to admit fMRI evidence in criminal courts; for example at the
end of 2009 tests performed by No Lie fMRI were presented as
evidence by the defense in a child protection hearing to prove
innocence claims of a parent accused of committing sexual abuse.
Had they been admitted that would have been the first time fMRI
was used in an American court (Simpson, 2008). They were not
but it might only be a matter of time before judges form the opin-
ion that fMRI may provide relevant scientific evidence (Aharoni
et al., 2012) opening the door to their wider admissibility.
Within this and the following sections we summarize and
bring together the multitude of hurdles which need to be
overcome before fMRI can ever be successfully integrated into
criminal trials. Our discussions are primarily restricted to the
English common law system of adversarial justice as applied
throughout the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia
amongst others, as opposed to the continental European mixed
adversarial-inquisitorial civil law systems. This decision is based
on the particular nature of adversarial trials, with its compet-
ing prosecution and defense counsels who in turn can engage
the services of competing expert neuroimaging witnesses, which
may exacerbate some of the issues surrounding fMRI evidence
discussed herein.
Legally, for scientific evidence to be admissible in criminal
trials it must meet the legal standards as set down in the rel-
evant jurisdiction, be these common law requirements such as
9In some states polygraph evidence is permitted when both the prosecution
and defense agree to its admissibility, while in others such evidence cannot be
admitted even when both parties would otherwise agree.
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either the test under Frye v United States (1923: 293 F.1013)
or the succeeding requirements under Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (1993: 509, U.S.579) as applied in Kumho
Tire Co. v Carmichael (1999: 526, U.S.137), the presence of
statutory requirements, international conventions, Federal Rules
of Evidence, or any permutation of these. Drawing from these
various requirements there are general principles that scientific
evidence must be both relevant and thereby possessing probative
value, as well as being reliable. It is primarily this second concept
of reliability that is our focus here.
Within the specific constraints of the criminal law we can com-
prehend scientific evidence as being reliable if, amongst other
things: the methods and results are both consistent and consis-
tently applied; the accuracy of results meets an acceptably high
standard while both false positives and false negatives are min-
imized; what practitioners believe is being measured is actually
being measured; the processes being measured are both under-
stood by scientists and are agreed upon by scientists working in
the field or who choose to examine the processes; and the scien-
tific processes being relied upon apply equally to all individuals
regardless of any internal or external traits or influences, or if
there is variation this has been addressed in relation to the indi-
vidual at hand. While these requirements may appear somewhat
ill-defined to the objective scientist, they reflect the style of judge-
made legalistic tests whereby relatively broad requirements may
be set down. Within the field of law this flexibility is not seen as
a vice as it both allows a future court to judge a case on its merits
and does not undermine the role of the jury as the final arbiter of
truth.
From the published fMRI literature it unavoidably emerges
that fMRI technology has not reached this reliability threshold.
Issues which require addressing by cognitive neuroscientists are
set out below:
(1) Assumptions and inferences underlying fMRI processes and
technologies need to be confirmed (or dispelled) so as to
give credence to the scientific claims being made. Cognitive
neuroscience, for example, assumes that complex thoughts
have a physical counterpart that is both accessible and inter-
pretable with technologies such as fMRI (Erickson, 2010).
Many fMRI researchers operate on the basic assumption
that lying involves additional efforts than telling the truth,
which in turn can be signaled by heightened blood flow
in specific brain regions (Gerard, 2008). However, several
fMRI studies have been employing “reverse inference” as
a central feature, whereby the activation of certain brain
regions (X) is taken as evidence of a particular cognitive
function (Y). As thoroughly discussed by Poldrack (2006),
such inferences are only deductively valid if brain state X
only occurs when cognitive function Y is engaged (i.e., if
a selective association between X and Y is established), yet
this one-to-one matching is not the case. Rather many-to-
many matching of brain states to mental states are observed,
and thus valid reverse inferences cannot be made here. What
is required first of all is the creation of a robust “cogni-
tive ontology” specifying the component brain operations
that comprise specific mental functions, even before trying
to establish univocal associations with functional anatomy
(Poldrack, 2010). Furthermore, data-driven pattern analy-
ses approaches (e.g., Haynes, 2008), although more current
in terms of the methodology and less constrained by theo-
retical assumptions, still rely on the objective identification
of what a lie is (e.g., Sip et al., 2008). However, this is not
always possible and is especially unlikely in forensic contexts
where lie detectors would be employed when neither facts
nor subjective intentions can be directly verified. The valid-
ity of underlying assumptions must be addressed and a wide
consensus reached within the scientific community before
possible applications of the technology can achieve broad
credibility.
(2) To achieve internal validity, it needs to be conclusively deter-
mined that what is being measured is actually evidence of
deception and not unrelated cognitive processes, and this
needs to be determinable for each and every response given
by every future individual undergoing fMRI questioning
when operational. Contrary to public expectations lie detec-
tors like fMRI are not mind readers, do not actually detect
deception, and will never provide details of what has actu-
ally happened in complicated cases. Rather theymerely detect
and measure manifestations of thoughts through changes in
oxygenated blood which proponents consider denotes lying
(Andrewartha, 2008; Holley, 2009). What fMRI lie detection
actually depends upon is an ability to detect the suppression
of competing responses, and yet remains hamstrung by the
inability to determine what these competing responses are
and what the suppression of these implies. As pointed out by
Grafton and colleagues, “[m]any defendants [while testify-
ing] do inhibit their natural tendency to blurt out everything
they know. They are circumspect about what they say. Many
of them also suppress expressions of anger and outrage at
accusation. Suppressing natural tendencies is not a reliable
indicator of lying, in the context of a trial” (Grafton et al.,
2006, pp. 36–37). Critics have also gone on to argue that any
exhibited increase in blood flow detected by fMRI may result
from alternate neurological process such as anxiety, fear, or
other heightened emotional states which are unrelated to the
question of deception. In other words, just because the pre-
frontal cortex is activated during deception it does not follow
that every time the prefrontal cortex activates the individual
is lying (Fox, 2009; Moreno, 2009). Furthermore, assuming
increased oxygenated blood flow in specific brain regions
denotes deception, scientists have not agreed with a degree of
precision as to what these specific regions are (Gerard, 2008).
Should cognitive neuroscientists successfully address these
questions, the machines and processes they develop will need
to be constantly identifying and correcting for extraneous
mental activity during the questioning process of criminal
suspect and witnesses, otherwise any results will be an open
target for legal challenge by opposing expert counsel.
(3) The question of individual differences affecting fMRI results
needs to be answered. The importance of this issue for a tech-
nology seeking both legitimacy and broad application cannot
be underestimated. Neuroimaging devices need to be able to
identify and correct for variances in individuals’ brains and
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not operate on shared but unproven assumptions that all or
most brain’s process lies similarly (Ellenberg, 2009; Holley,
2009). This includes correcting for variations in brain pro-
cesses based on age; particularly juveniles. They need to be
able to cope with the types of individuals usually encountered
by law enforcement officers, including substance addicts,
those with high incentives to lie, and those with mental dis-
orders. Doubts already exist as to whether fMRI would be
usable for those presenting with conditions such as delusions
and amnestic disorders with confabulation (Langleben et al.,
2006). Finally there is the issue of possible differences in out-
puts resulting from the social diversity of those tested, given
that what is considered a lie is a matter of social convention
which may vary on a cultural basis (Holley, 2009).
(4) The question of whether subjects or questioners canmanipu-
late the fMRI baseline or response data needs to be addressed.
To measure neurophysiological changes in the brain, neu-
roimaging devices must be able to create a reliable baseline
against which comparisons can be formed. In this regard
fMRI depends upon the cooperation of the subject and
is highly vulnerable to countermeasures (e.g., Ganis et al.,
2011). Trained participants can alter test results by engag-
ing in some taxing activity like mental calculations dur-
ing control sequences which will enormously reduce the
power of the contrast between truthful statements and lies.
Furthermore, it is not yet clear whether extensive rehearsing
of a story which subsequently requires virtually no men-
tal effort to retell will diminish detection rates (see Ganis
et al., 2003 for a first attempt to distinguish spontaneous from
rehearsed lies; Gerard, 2008). A separate issue of manipula-
tion relates to both experimenter and questioner expectancy
effects. Consider a scenario whereby fMRI evidence is con-
sidered admissible and a criminal suspect is being questioned
while undergoing an fMRI. Undoubtedly, the suspect will
be influenced by the questioner’s expectancy of guilty (for
example via the questioner’s tone of voice, their reactions,
mannerisms, etc.). Accordingly, these experimenter effects
(or questioner expectancy effects) are likely to influence the
suspect’s neurological processes. They would need to be both
recognized and treated as noise, making it more difficult to
determine what the observed brain activity actually means.
(5) The subjectivity inherent in fMRI analysis algorithms needs
to be acknowledged and these algorithms opened up for
scrutiny. It has been claimed that fMRI output is superior
to previous assisted lie detection methods partly because of
the automated interpretation of results with computer algo-
rithms which reduce the risk of human error by minimizing
experimenter bias and subjectivity (Bilz, 2008–2009; Gerard,
2008). However, algorithms are not purely objective artifacts;
they encapsulate and reproduce all the subjectivity, bias, and
assumptions of the programmers, and some of these may
differ each and every time they are applied. This can intro-
duce errors that bias results in an unevenly distributed way
across individuals. Furthermore, as Simpson (2008) notes,
separate research groups have devised their own independent
statistical methods for identifying brain activity they each
believe consistent with lying. This development of diverse
approaches increases the variability of results and the gen-
eral reliability of the technique (see Bennett andMiller, 2010,
for a thorough discussion of the issue); the consequences of
which should not be underestimated and will be amplified
in an applied setting. For if competing (but accepted) algo-
rithms produce conflicting results when interpreting fMRI
questioning data then opposing prosecution and defense
experts will each exploit the one which best serves their pur-
poses in court leading to a stalemate of probative value and a
negation of fMRI evidence.
(6) We need to determine the percentage of the population who
for various reasons are unable to undertake an fMRI, as well
as the nature of those reasons. fMRI is highly sensitive to
movement, requiring subjects remain virtually motionless
for long periods of time during questioning for the slight-
est head movement can wreck the resulting image. According
to a review by Alexander (2007) of fMRI trials published
between 2001 and 2006, ∼20% of subjects (38 of 192) were
rejected because of head motion artifacts or insufficient data.
Add to this the physical construction of MRI machines which
involves the use of powerful magnets and the number of
groups who will not be able to undergo fMRI questioning
grows. This includes those with medical conditions such as
Parkinson disease which prevents then remaining still with-
out medication, those suffering claustrophobia, people with
medical implants, metal pins, piercings, and shrapnel; all of
whichmay preclude fMRI questioning (Gerard, 2008; Holley,
2009; see Appendix A).
(7) Questions over the methodological validity of past and future
fMRI studies must be answered. Many of the fMRI trials
to date have compared group differences rather than indi-
viduals, and the few accuracy levels reported range between
78 and 90%. This discrepancy within detection rates counts
against fMRI gaining admissibility within criminal trials and
will not be remedied until more studies are published for peer
review (Gerard, 2008). Furthermore, according to Moreno
(2009) a recent meta-analysis of existing neuroscience data
taken from published studies revealed that more than half of
these employed defective research methods producing dubi-
ous results as a result of distorted data and biased correlation
analysis; specifically non-independence error (see Vul et al.,
2009).
(8) To attain external validity, experiments need to be applicable
beyond highly controlled laboratory settings to confronta-
tional, emotional “high-stakes” criminal justice situations.
Criminal investigations and trials are confrontational and
may represent high personal stakes for those involved. This
will affect the individuals’ mental state and underlying neuro-
logical processes (see e.g., Sip et al., 2010, 2012; for evidence
of modulation on both deception behavior and its brain
correlates in social contexts). As Andrewartha (2008, p. 93)
states, “[t]his perhaps explains why considerable judicial crit-
icism has been made of the purported reliability of utilizing
lie detector machines in litigation. The propriety of equating
simulated scientific testing with real life scenarios for the pur-
pose of evidence is highly questionable.” Unless researchers
can show fMRI testing is suitably robust for the criminal
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law setting then this technology will remain unacceptable.
Randomized controlled trials with currently available test-
ing protocols may not be a straightforward solution to this.
In addition to result interpretation problems and the current
lack of a comprehensive model of deception, “translational
validation” requires access to real-world situations with min-
imal interference and the possibility to derive an objective
index of performance for deception detection. The outcome
of court proceedings, for example, could not be taken as
an objective parameter for the discrimination between lie
and truth (whatever lie detection task is being translation-
ally validated). It is instead already possible to predict that
the introduction of fMRI evidence will significantly influence
juror decision-making, if unchallenged (see e.g., McCabe
et al., 2011).
According to skeptics the enthusiasm for brain imaging and
related “mind reading” applications largely overestimate its cur-
rent ability to identify unique neural correlates of complex mental
functions such as lying (but see Haynes and Rees, 2006; Haynes,
2008). Brain activations look extremely persuasive but they result
from a long series of manipulations, assumptions, and inter-
pretations. A precise and robust model of the mental processes
involved in lying should guide hypotheses about brain activa-
tions, however such a generally acceptedmodel remains absent. In
addition, lies can be of different types (i.e., denying an event that
has occurred vs. making up a slightly different story vs. telling a
truth which will be interpreted as a lie; for example, think of a
betrayed partner asking “with whom have you had dinner last
night?,” and the cheater sarcastically replying: “with my lover,
obviously!” thereby telling the truth with the intent to make it
sound like a lie). The context of basic fMRI experiments is arti-
ficial and one often has to sacrifice external for internal validity,
and any attempts to make them more similar to real world sce-
narios will almost inevitably undermine internal validity. Finally
the available literature cannot be generalized to all populations
for lie detection protocols have not been tested on juveniles,
the elderly, or individuals with problems of substance abuse,
antisocial personality, mental retardation, head injury, dementia.
In summary, while fMRI may be a useful research tool in com-
bination with other techniques to clarify themechanisms involved
in lying, and its degree of sensitivity and specificity in lie detection
may be higher than that of the polygraph, most scientists cur-
rently agree that fMRI research evidence is still weak and lacks
both external and construct validity (Spence, 2008). We also must
conclude that the current state of the science does not at this
time meet the legal standards for admissibility in court proceed-
ings (see Simpson, 2008 and Merikangas, 2008, for exhaustive
discussions).
LEGAL AND ETHICAL HURDLES
Since the 1920s proponents of assisted lie detection technologies
have been predicting their inevitable acceptance by courts; first
for polygraphs and now for neuroimaging technologies (Gerard,
2008), however to date fMRI evidence has never successfully been
admitted in court for determining the veracity of statements by
witnesses or defendants. This reflects the deep skepticism held
by the judiciary as to the reliability of assisted lie detection tech-
niques. This skepticism is partly borne out of the failure of the
polygraph and now threatens to taint this new generation of
neuroimaging technologies. The perverse irony for the cognitive
neuroscientists who have been developing these new technolo-
gies in a conscious effort to address the legal short-comings of
polygraphs, is that while techniques like fMRI might well-tick the
boxes of reliability and objectivity when perfected, the solution of
bypassing physiological responses in favor of the direct recording
of neural activity may itself constitute grounds for the judiciary
to reject neuroimaging technologies. Not because such solutions
will necessarily lack reliability or objectivity, but because they
potentially infringe other human/constitutional rights and legal
principles. The developers of neuroimaging technologies need to
acknowledge and engage with these legal issues before they seek
to impose their new techniques into criminal courts if they are
to maximize their chances of winning over the already skepti-
cal judicial gate-keepers. For should they fail to find a way to
square their new technologies with the existing legal principles set
out below, then without legislative intervention their technologies
will remain excluded from criminal courts.
(1) Possible constitutional and human rights violations (illegal
search, right to silence, freedom of thought, right to pri-
vacy, human dignity, right to integrity of the person, and
protection of personal data):
Looking across various common law legal systems, a number of
constitutional principles, and human rights conventions10 will be
engaged to differing degrees within different jurisdictions by the
neuroimaging processes of fMRI. Ultimately without legislative
intervention it will be the respective national courts who will be
forced to rule on each of these issues, either when parties first
seek to introduce fMRI evidence of statement veracity into crimi-
nal trials, or upon appeals to the first convictions/acquittals where
this technology played a material part in arriving at a verdict. It is
not our intention to examine each of these in depth here, rather to
discuss broadly the various legal hurdles which must be addressed
if fMRI is to find its place within criminal trials for determining
the veracity of statements made.
The first set of issues is whether fMRI questioning constitutes
a search of the subject, and when such a search will be considered
lawful or unlawful. Discussions in this area tend to center on the
US Constitutional Fourth Amendment protecting against unrea-
sonable or unlawful searches (see Pardo, 2006, and Holley, 2009,
amongst others for in-depth discussions on this point). A view
exists that neuroimaging techniques will constitute a legitimate
search under established legal doctrine should neural activity be
10The sources examined here are: the US Constitution (limited in application
to US citizens within US territories), the European Convention on Human
Rights (produced by, and applying to, the 47 member states of the Council
of Europe, and overseen by the European Court of Human Rights), and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (applicable to all citi-
zens and residents of the 28 member states of the EU, this Charter enshrines a
range of personal, civil, and social rights and existing conventions and treaties
(including the European Convention on Human Rights) into EU law thus
ensuring their legal certainty).
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equated to other forms of physical evidence gathered from the
human body, such as blood or DNA sampling, fingerprints, voice
sampling, etc., providing probable cause exists justifying such
sampling (Pardo, 2006). However, it is easy to conceptualize neu-
ral activity as distinct from other forms of physiological evidence.
For example, while we can manipulate neural activity by con-
ducting mathematical problems in our head, we cannot change
our DNA profile through thought processes. What legal weight
such a distinction would carry is moot until tested in court. The
more challenging question is whether or not authorities should
be allowed to record our neural activity without our consent, or
even our knowledge. When confronted with this problem courts
will be forced to either shoehorn this new technology into existing
legal frameworks governing conceptually similar subject matter
(i.e., DNA, blood, fingerprints, etc.) or produce new bespoke legal
frameworks for their governance. In the latter case, the form of
any new framework cannot be predicted. A final difficult ques-
tion is whether police could require a person to undergo an fMRI
test without a warrant, with no clear consensus existing between
commentators on this point (see Pardo, 2006 and Holley, 2009).
Another set of issues is whether fMRI questioning under-
mines the right to silence and the right not to self-incriminate.
Neuroimaging technology has the potential to undermine these
rights if it can operate without the individual needing to speak.
Within the United States, the Supreme Court has previously
speculated that “the involuntary transmission of incriminat-
ing lie-detection evidence would violate a suspect’s right to
silence” (Simpson, 2008: 767). Under the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) whilst there is no explicit protec-
tion against self-incrimination, in the case of Funke v France
(A/256-A, 1993; 1 C.M.L.R. 897, ECHR) the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) was explicit that the right not to self-
incriminate is an implicit component of one’s Right to a fair
trial under Article 6 ECHR (Jackson, 2009) though it is not an
absolute right (Berger, 2006). The ECtHR in Saunders v United
Kingdom (1997, 23 EHRR 313) drew a distinction between mate-
rial which respects the will of the suspect to remain silent and
materials which exists independent of the suspect’s will such
as DNA, blood, urine, and breath. Unfortunately what they
left for a future court to decide is whether or not an individ-
ual’s brain activity exists independent of their will to remain
silent?
It must also be asked whether questioning in fMRI without
consent engages Article 8 Right to respect for private and fam-
ily life and Article 9 Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
of the ECHR. Article 8(1) has been broadly interpreted in the
past, and it is readily conceivable that processes which seek to
determine the veracity of our statements by measuring neural
activity will engage this right. The question will turn on whether
or not police will be able to conduct questioning in fMRI under
the Article 8(2) qualifications of national security, public safety,
and crime prevention, and what protections will needed to ensure
proportionality. The answer to this might well be tied with Article
9, for to allow the state to access thoughts without consent and
knowledge may have a chilling effect on both individuals and
society as they seek to exercise their freedom of thought. Courts
may well-seek to impose stringent safeguards on neuroimaging
technology to prevent both the overuse andmisuse of them if they
feel these rights are threatened.
Additionally a number of rights within the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) may also
prove challenging for fMRI use in court proceedings. Article 1
Human dignity states that human dignity is inviolable and must
be respected and protected. It is possible to argue that fMRI
questioning without consent undermines an individual’s dignity.
Article 3 Right to the integrity of the person potentially poses the
greatest challenge; especially Article 3(1) that everyone has the
right to respect for their physical and mental integrity. This right
may also be engaged by enforced or non-consensual fMRI ques-
tioning, especially given the express recognition of both physical
and mental components. It is worth noting here that within
France, Art.45 of LOI n◦2011-814 of 7 July 2011 (i.e., post ratifi-
cation of the CFREU) which created Art.16-14 of the French Civil
Code11 specifically limits the use of brain imaging techniques to
medical purposes, scientific research, and in the context of judicial
enquiries carried out by experts. But most importantly that the
express and informed consent of the individual must be obtained
in writing prior to any imaging, and that this consent is revocable
at any time. Given how few national legislators have specifically
acknowledged the use of neuroimaging in judicial proceedings,
let alone the issue of consent, this early approach by the French
government takes on considerable significance.
Finally Article 8 CFREU Protection of personal data poses a
number of interesting questions. Firstly would fMRI data con-
stitute personal data and thus fall under the protection of this
article? Given the uniquely nature of such imaging in relation
to an individual this must surely be the case. Assuming this is
correct, under Article 8(2) everyone has the right to access their
personal data and to have it rectified. As a result given the current
fallibility of fMRI evidence, one could always argue that an inter-
pretation of such data is incorrect and must be rectified. It would
be interesting to see the effects on the admissibility of fMRI evi-
dence in courts where one party seeks to challenge the ostensibly
incorrect interpretation of their fMRI results by the other.
(2) Compelled questioning and covert surveillance:
The issues of compelled questioning and (as the technology devel-
ops) covert neuroimaging surveillance are ones which courts will
be forced to face given the potentially profound impact covert
surveillance of this nature will have on society as a whole. One
of the concerns raised is the potential for authorities to use these
technologies for fishing trips whereby police would question an
individual to determine whether they have committed criminal
acts in the past without any pre-existing evidence or reasonable
suspicion. For police to search before they suspect is to under-
mine the presumption of innocence upon which our common
law legal systems are built. Though as Pardo (2006) notes, it is
not certain that such actions will be prevented under current
regimes.
11Taken from the French Civil Code, Book I: People, Title I: The Civil Rights,
Chapter IV: the use of brain imaging techniques.
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(3) Probative value, unfair prejudice, and undermining the
Province of the Jury:
For evidence (including scientific evidence) to be admissible in
criminal courts it must be relevant, thus possessing probative
value. The probative value of evidence can be defined as “the
extent to which [this evidence] increases or decreases the prob-
ability of a fact in issue” (Dennis, 2007, p.108). Thus, for fMRI
evidence the probative value is the extent to which it increases or
decreases the subjective veracity probability of a declarant’s state-
ment; i.e., how it affects the factual probability that a person does
or does not believe what they are saying.
However, probative value also refers to the degree of relevance
evidence possesses, which is the extent to which evidence influ-
ences the probability of a fact in issue in the mind of a rational
juror. Within England and Wales if the judge considers the pro-
bative value of evidence will have a prejudicial effect on this
juror “disproportionate to the rational strength of the evidence
as a means of proof, [then] the exclusionary discretion is avail-
able [to the judge] to prevent an accused suffering prejudice”
(Dennis, 2007, p.108); thus the judge can exclude such dispropor-
tionate evidence. An example of evidence excluded may include
full-color graphic photographs of injuries when a party seeks
to admit these in addition to clear and factual medical reports.
Similarly, within the US Federal Rules of Evidence (Rule 403,
Federal Rules of Evidence) where the probative value of otherwise
admissible evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice then this evidence too can be excluded. The
question therefore becomes, will the courts reject prima facie
admissible fMRI evidence on the basis that, because of its nature
(or its presentation) it risks unfairly prejudicing the accused?
Fears have been raised that: the graphic nature of fMRI evi-
dence will result in unfair prejudice; that scientific lie detection
evidence will unduly influence and taint jury deliberations; that
jurors will not use their intuition and independent reasoning
to critically challenge neuroimaging evidence; and that through
function-creep such evidence will trespass into the Province of the
Jury by effectively usurping their role as arbiter of fact (Gerard,
2008; see Weisberg et al., 2008 for evidence that fMRI images
are seen as more compelling that other types and formats of
data).
Supporters of neuroscience technologies consider concerns
over the undermining of judges and juries as unfounded; rather
neuroimaging evidence will simply make the predictions of verac-
ity by jurors and judges more reliable (Pardo, 2006). Pardo makes
the argument that:
Because even a highly reliable neuroscience test would not estab-
lish knowledge or lies directly, jurors would still need to play their
traditional role in assessing it. In making these assessments, the
jury would, for example, consider whether other evidence regard-
ing credibility should override the test results, rendering the test
conclusion unlikely. (2006: 318)
While this statement seeks to defend and support fMRI in crim-
inal courts, it unwittingly demonstrates the danger that this
technology will import unfair prejudice into criminal trials. To
explain; by rightly accepting that even a highly reliable neu-
roimaging test does not directly establish knowledge or lies one
must ask “what is the point of introducing evidence to a jury
from a technology that cannot provide direct evidence as to
the veracity of statements made but is still marketed and pro-
moted as a scientifically accurate lie detector12?” The obvious
danger here is that the nuance between lie detection and state-
ment veracity will not be clearly explained at the start of a case
and/or not maintained and reinforced as the case progresses,
leading juries to overestimate the capabilities of this technol-
ogy. This is highlighted by the remainder of the above quote
where the neuroimaging test results are already being presented
by the author as the de facto position of truth, one which
can only by overridden should other evidence regarding credi-
bility override the test results; i.e., the tests shall be the truth
unless you can prove otherwise. This statement, while seeking
to defend neuroimaging technologies, actually serves to highlight
the potential disproportional probative effect of neuroscience lie
detectors. Cognitive neuroscientists must be careful not to over-
play what these technologies can offer criminal courts nor their
vision of the potential future role of neuroscience within crim-
inal courts, lest they overplay themselves out of the courtroom
altogether.
(4) Right to a fair trial:
Depending on how questioning in fMRI is conducted for crim-
inal trials it can be argued that the fairness of trials will be
placed at risk unless all parties to the trial are subjected to pre-
trial questioning in fMRI. Presenting fMRI evidence from only
one party to the case may result in an artificial disparity of
evidence; i.e., the neuroimaging evidence plus testimony vs. tes-
timony without neuroimaging evidence. Justice may now depend
on whether or not a jury will question a technology promoted
as a highly accurate lie detector, so to ensure parity of arms
and a fair trial all parties should be subjected to pre-trial ques-
tioning in fMRI if they are ever introduced. Of course such a
scenario depends on all the parties being capable of undergoing
fMRI testing which is not the case when the victim is dead or
comatose. In these circumstances fMRI evidence may need to be
prohibited.
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that fMRI evidence may become
admissible solely as a defense instrument given that struc-
tural brain scans have already found acceptance and are widely
admissible as mitigating evidence during sentencing proceed-
ings. Indeed such use may help ensure a trial is ultimately fair.
However, any attempt to extrapolate from this niche application
such that fMRI evidence can be used throughout the entirety of
12Both of the two commercial companies offering fMRI detection service
specifically and deliberately promote their technologies as scientific lie detec-
tion tools and not as veracity probability enhancement tools; No Lie MRI
claims their technology ‘represents the first and only direct measure of truth
verification and lie detection in human history’ (see http://noliemri.com/),
while CEPHOS Corp claims to have developed ‘the latest, most scientifically
advanced, brain imaging techniques for scientifically accurate lie detection’
(see http://www.cephoscorp.com/).
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the trial but only by the defense represents an arguably unaccept-
able asymmetry of measures; one which potentially undermines
the overall fairness of the trial (both actual and perceived) and
the rights of victims.
CONCLUDING POINTS
Our discussion throughout has focused on the scientific, legal,
and ethical hurdles facing those seeking to introduce fMRI evi-
dence into trials as a means of assisting judges and juries in
determining the veracity of statements made. Schauer (2010)
suggests that as the goals of the law differ from those of sci-
ence, what is not good enough for science may yet be good
enough for the law and vice versa. However, following our
assessments of the science underpinning fMRI as a lie detec-
tor and how this relates to the law, we must conclude that
the current state of this technology, and potentially the tech-
nology per se, fails to meet either acceptable scientific or legal
standards.
The evaluation of fMRI accuracy in lie detection—in some
cases claimed to be as high as 0.90—is indeed based on labora-
tory experiments conducted with compliant participants, which
is unlikely to be true of most legal settings where non-compliance
and the use of countermeasures would make its accuracy fig-
ure drop dramatically (e.g., Ganis et al., 2011). In the cog-
nitive neurosciences fMRI is not sufficient by itself to unveil
which brain areas are epiphenomenal, which are strictly nec-
essary to lying. It may thus pick up some noise together with
the real signal. Even if it was possible to produce a correla-
tional map where a constant pattern could be detected indicating
a lie, issues of replicability and generalizability across condi-
tions and participants could be raised. And even more so in
those cases where facts are unknown to the tester and there is
no objective reality against which to establish whether a per-
son is lying or not. From the legal perspective, until the science
behind fMRI testing improves it will not meet the relevance
and reliability thresholds required for any scientific evidence to
be admissible in criminal trials. The assumptions, inferences,
and questions of internal validity which so pervade current
fMRI testing and analysis need to be addressed. As does the
challenge of successfully applying this technology to criminal
justice scenarios characterized by their confrontational emo-
tional nature and the personal high-stakes involved for the
participants.
Neuroimaging in courts also raises the specter of potential
constitutional and human rights violations. Questions arise as
to whether or not such testing constitutes an illegal search as
well as how it respects rights to privacy, silence, thought, and a
fair trial are all engaged by this technology yet left unanswered.
Unless the admissibility decision is taken out of the hands of
the judiciary by politicians, which is itself a likely scenario, ulti-
mately it will be for the courts to decide the fate of fMRI evidence
in criminal trials. Given the range and depth of the legal and
ethical issues identified in the earlier sections, the likely out-
come will probably fall on a spectrum somewhere between out-
right rejection through to some form of restricted and regulated
usage, as opposed to the highly unlikely scenario of carte blanche
acceptance.
What we have not discussed within this paper are both the
operational and social barriers to the widespread use of fMRI
testing in criminal trials. These barriers are potentially just as
daunting as their scientific and legal counterparts.
From the practical operational perspective, issues which require
future examination include; the cost of purchasing, staffing, and
maintaining sufficient fMRI machines to cater for a national
justice system; the additional time and monetary costs fMRI
testing will add to criminal cases; how fMRI testing can be
made to work within adversarial systems of questioning and
cross-examination based on earlier responses; and the lack of
a courtroom-friendly portable fMRI system. Additionally there
are questions specific to the assessment algorithms used when
interpreting fMRI response data: will only a single universal offi-
cial algorithm be allowed?; will commercial patented algorithms
be admissible if they are not completely open for inspection
and independent verification?; and finally what happens when
new algorithms and new fMRI scanners are inevitably devel-
oped as the science is continually refined which prove to be
more reliable and sensitive than previous algorithms/machines?
It is conceivable that those who maintain their innocence and
are appealing their conviction under the previous technology
will seek to be re-tested with the new machines and the new
algorithm in an effort to prove their innocence placing a fur-
ther burden on the criminal justice system. All of these points
possess the potential to impact upon the fairness of future
trials.
A final hurdle to the widespread introduction of fMRI test-
ing is societal acceptability, without which technologies such as
neuroimaging techniques for determining the veracity of state-
ments within criminal trials will lack both public confidence and
legitimacy. Future research needs to gauge the levels of public
support for such technologies, for even if neuroimaging proves
superior to humans as arbiters of statement veracity in criminal
courts, this fact in of itself may not be enough for the public
to accept their introduction if they are apprehensive or hostile
to what such technologies represent for their future. We cannot
escape from asking the question, will people accept mind reading
machines? This is obviously not what the current generation of
neuroimaging technologies is, but they are a small step down this
long path.
Our societies have developed to both accept and respect an
individual’s right to keep secrets, and in so doing they do not seek
to override human beings’ evolved capacity to keep secrets, for a
society where individuals are denied secrets is not a human soci-
ety as we know it. The developers and proponents of fMRI testing
must respect this fact and engage society in their research as it
progresses. Otherwise they may find they successfully negotiate
the frying-pan of scientific and technical challenges in perfecting
fMRI testing only to be consumed by a fire of legal, ethical, social,
and political opposition.
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